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NOTES AND COMMENTS
to all. But, it seems clear that privacy of the individual is one factor
that the Court will take into consideration in the determination of
cases which arise in these areas.
CHARLES M. HENSEY
Contracts-Cost-Plus Building and Construction Contracts-
Interpretation of "Cost"
Perhaps the most frequently litigated issue arising from con-
struction contracts on a cost-plus basis' is the proper interpretation
of the word "cost." In Lytle, Campbell & Co. v. Somers, Fitler &
Todd Co.,' the leading case in this area, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court formulated the general rule3 that, unless a definition is ex-
pressly written into the contract, "cost" must be interpreted to mean
only those expenses which can be said to be "operative" or of a
productive nature in actually completing the construction, as dis-
tinguished from non-productive, indirect and general expenses or
"overhead." 4 The latter are presumed to have been provided for in
the agreed percentage of profit.5
'A "cost-plus contract" is one in which the contractor agrees to do cer-
tain work at cost plus a stated percentage of the cost as profit. It is different
from a "cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract" where the agreement is to do work
at cost plus a fixed amount of compensation, but for the purposes of this
note no distinction will be made between them since the problems attendant
to the interpretation of the word "cost" are the same in each. See, e.g.,
Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. Bloom, 139 Conn. 700, 96 A.2d 758(1953). See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts §367(b) (1939); Annot. 27
A.L.R. 48 (1923).
2276 Pa. 409, 120 At. 409 (1923).
'Since the Lytle, Campbell case purported to lay down a general rule
for the interpretation of all cost-plus contracts no attempt has been made to
reconcile the cases on the basis of the precise wording of the contract before
the court. Those courts citing and relying on the Lytle, Campbell case have
tended to look to the class of contract involved, rather than the particular
words employed. See, e.g., Vinson & Pringle v. Lanteen Medical Lab., 63
Ariz. 115, 159 P.2d 612 (1945) ; Jensen v. Manthe, 168 Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d
699 (1959); Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 84 A.2d 617
(1951); Nolop v. Spettel, 267 Wis. 245, 64 N.W.2d 859 (1954). Cf. Dunn
v. Hammon Drug Co., 79 Ariz. 101, 284 P.2d 468 (1955).
'The rule of Lytle, Campbell has been cited with approval in many cases,
none of which have questioned its validity. See, e.g., Advance Auto Body
Works, Inc. v. Asbury Transp. Co., 10 Cal. App. 2d 619, 52 P.2d 958 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1935); Michelson v. House, 54 N.M. 197, 218 P.2d 861 (1950).
The normal definition of the word "profit," in the absence of circum-
stances tending to show otherwise, is "net profit," that is, the remainder
after all expenses of whatever nature have been paid. Buie v. Kennedy, 164
N.C. 290, 80 S.E. 445 (1913); Thomas v. Columbia Phonograph Co., 144
Wis. 470, 129 N.W. 522 (1911). Yet the word "profit" in a cost-plus agree-
ment is given a different meaning in that certain types of expenses, those
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The great weight of authority appears to be that under a cost-
plus agreement the contractor is not entitled to recover as part of
his "cost" that portion of his general overhead directly attributable
to the specific undertaking in question.' But the decisions display a
striking lack of unanimity as to whether certain specific items should
be classified as "costs" or "overhead." Among such items are taxes
and insurance, supervision fees, sub-contractor's overhead and profits,
wages paid to unproductive or non-essential labor, and use, rental
and depreciation of equipment.
Taxes and Insurance
There would appear to be little doubt that expenses for public
liability and workmen's compensation insurance and various social
security taxes7 do not contribute directly toward the erection of a
classified as "overhead," are presumed to be included within the stated
percentage of profit. No case has been found in which this anomaly has
been noted, but there appears to be no sound reason for creating an inflexible
exception to the general rule.
'See, e.g., Denemark v. Ed B. Mooney, Inc., 218 Ark. 944, 237 S.W.2d
41 (1951); House v. Fissell, 188 Md. 160, 51 A.2d 669 (1947); Shaw v.
G. B. Beaumont Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 333, 102 Atl. 151 (Ct. Ch. 1917). Contra,
Hoggson Bros. v. Spiekerman, 175 App. Div. 144, 161 N.Y. Supp. 930(1916) ; cf. Hamilton v. Coogan, 7 Misc. 677, 28 N.Y. Supp. 21 (C.P. 1894).
In Benes v. Hickox Bldg. Co., 89 N.E.2d 315 (Ohio App. 1949), general
overhead was treated as part of cost in computing damages for breach of a
cost-plus contract where the owner had prevented performance.
The rule denying overhead would appear to be inconsistent with the
practice of computing damages for breach of a regular fixed-fee contract.
Where performance of a fixed-fee contract has been prevented, the measure
of damages is the cost of the work already done plus the profit reasonably
expected if completion had been allowed. There overhead is treated as part
of cost. See Sofarelli Bros., Inc. v. Elgin, 129 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1942);
Grand Trunk Western R.R. v. H. W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823 (6th Cir.
1941); Snyder v. Reading Scho. Dist., 311 Pa. 326, 166 At]. 875 (1933);
Dravco Contracting Co. v. James Rees & Sons Co., 291 Pa. 387, 140 Atl. 148(1927). But cf. Harris & Harris v. Crain & Denbo, 256 N.C. 110, 123 S.E.2d590 (1962).
It would also appear that a different rule may be applied where the con-
tract is to manufacture an article in the first instance on a cost-plus basis
as opposed to the construction of a building. In Mailander v. Continental
State Bank, 11 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), the court stated in a
dictum that the rule denying recovery of overhead under a cost-plus contract
did not apply in this situation, but did not say what the correct rule was. No
case has been found squarely on point where the contract in question was
on a cost-plus basis. Cf. Alvey Conveyer Mfg. Co. v. Kansas City Terminal
Ry., 356 Mo. 770, 203 S.W.2d 606 (1947); International Contract Co. v.
City of Tacoma, 79 Wash. 311, 140 Pac. 373 (1914).
As employers, contractors are generally required by state and federal
law to purchase certain insurance and pay employment taxes if they employ
more than a stated number of persons. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
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building but are part of the general cost of doing business and are,
therefore, indirect and non-productive. Arizona and Rhode Island
have held that these are not proper charges under a cost-plus con-
tract unless it affirmatively appears the parties intended otherwise.8
However, the trend appears to be toward treating these items as
part of cost.9
Supervision Fees
Under the Lytle, Campbell rule only the actual manual labor
performed on the structure may be recovered as cost. This would
appear to preclude wages paid to a foreman or supervisor as an item
of cost; yet the trend of the courts is toward allowing supervision
fees, at least where the supervisor is an employee and not the con-
tractor himself.'0 Washington has drawn an interesting distinction
§§ 3301 (unemployment insurance), 3111 (F.I.C.A.); MD. ANN. CODE art.
95A, § 8 (1957) (unemployment insurance); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-29-
6 (1956) (workmen's compensation insurance).8 Vinson & Pringle v. Lanteen Medical Lab., 63 Ariz 115, 159 P.2d 612(1945); Brown v. Benn, 75 R.I. 76, 63 A.2d 781 (1949); Pelletier Const.
Co. v. Trullis, 70 R.I. 121, 37 A.2d 369 (1944).
'House v. Fissell, 188 Md. 160, 51 A.2d 669 (1947) ; Jensen v. Manthe,
168 Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d 699 (1959) (dictum). Cf. Piehl v. Marino 254
Wis. 538, 36 N.W.2d. 694 (1949), where these items were not allowed due
to failure of the contractor to establish that they were reasonable.
The California decisions are in conflict. These items were not allowed
in Advance Auto Body Works, Inc. v. Asbury Transp. Co., 10 Cal. App. 2d
619, 52 P.2d 958 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935), but this decision appears not to
have been followed, and there is no ruling as yet by the California Supreme
Court. These items were allowed in Eby v. Bensemon, 177 Cal. App. 2d 756,
2 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Vowels v. Witt. 149 Cal. App. 2d
257, 308 P.2d 415 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (dictum); Cunningham v. Weaver,
130 Cal. App. 2d 787, 279 P.2d 830 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) ; cf. Citizens State
Bank v. Gentry, 20 Cal. App. 2d 415, 67 P.2d 364 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937)(allowed on an estoppel theory); Boat & Barge Corp. v. Beverly Fin. Co.,
71 Cal. App. 2d 800, 163 P.2d 913 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945).
Washington has held that sales tax is an item of cost. Irwin v. Sanders,
49 Wash. 2d 600, 304 P.2d 697 (1956). It has also been held that the
Indiana gross income tax is an item of cost to the contractor as a tax directly
chargeable to the work. Herlihy Mid-Continent Co. v. Northern Ind. Pub.
Ser. Co., 245 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1957).
" The decisions in this area are in conflict. In Timmons v. Nelsen, 159
Neb. 193, 66 N.W.2d 406 (1954), it was held that the salary of a general
supervisor could not be recovered as cost since this was the responsibility of
the contractor himself, even though another was hired to do the work. But
the expense of work actually performed by the supervisor in construction
was allowed. But see Jensen v. Manthe, 168 Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d 699(1959), where the court stated in a dictum that supervision costs were gen-
erally regarded as operative and not overhead.
Supervision costs were allowed in Churchill v. Anderson, 128 F. Supp.
425 (W.D. Ky. 1955) (supervisor was partner of contractor); Crone v.
Amado, 69 Ariz. 389, 214 P.2d 518 (1950); Ferguson v. A. F. Stewart
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between supervision at the "operative" and at the "administrative"
level, including the former as an item of cost but classifying the
latter as overhead."
Sub-Contractor's Overhead and Profits
Under a strict application of the Lytle, Campbell rule the main
contractor may not include as part of his costs any sums paid to
sub-contractors for items which he could not have included had he
done the work himself. Thus the sub-contractor's overhead and
profits must be paid by the main contractor out of his own profits.
Only one case so holding has been found. 2 The weight of authority
is that the entire amount paid to sub-contractors is part of the main
contractor's cost, even though this may include overhead and
profits.' 8
Wages Paid to Unproductive or Non-Essential Labor
Often an employer cannot obtain labor at any price without com-
plying with various union regulations concerning the minimum num-
ber of laborers to be hired, rest periods, and so forth. Such regulations
may substantially increase labor costs without resulting in a corre-
spondingly greater work out-put. Under the Lytle, Campbell rule
that portion of labor costs which might be said to be unproductive
or non-essential would be excluded from costs.' 4 Yet in Willett v.
Davis,'5 the one case in which the problem has been squarely raised,
the Washington Supreme Court had little difficulty in including as
cost all wages required to be paid in order to get the work done,
Const. Co., 115 Okla. 31, 241 Pac. 121 (1925). Cf. Carrico v. City & County
of San Francisco, 177 Cal. App. 2d 97, 2 Cal. Rptr. 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960)(general contractor allowed to recover for compensation paid by sub-contrac-
tor to superintendent).
" Whitney v. McKay, 54 Wash. 2d 672, 344 P.2d 497 (1959).
" Grafton Hotel Co. v. Walsh, 228 Fed. 5 (4th Cir. 1915).
1" Churchill v. Anderson, 128 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Ky. 1955); Carrico v.
City & County of San Francisco, 177 Cal. App. 2d 97, 2 Cal. Rptr. 87 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960); Eby v. Bensemon, 177 Cal. App. 2d 756, 2 Cal. Rptr. 503(Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Ford & Butterleld v. St. Louis, K. & N.W. Ry., 54
Iowa 723, 7 N.W. 126 (1880); Baker v. Stamps, 82 So. 2d 858 (La. App.
1955) ; Jensen v. Manthe, 168 Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d 699 (1959) ; Hamilton v.
Coogan, 7 Misc. 677, 28 N.Y. Supp. 21 (C.P. 1894). Kentucky and Wiscon-
sin have held that whether these items were intended to be included as cost is
a jury question. Thoroughbred Motor Court, Inc. v. Allen Co., 296 S.W.2d
690 (Ky. 1956); Piehl v. Marino, 254 Wis. 538, 36 N.W.2d 694 (1949).
"Nolop v. Spettel, 267 Wis. 245, 64 N.W.2d 859 (1954).15 30 Wash. 2d 622, 193 P.2d 321 (1948).
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regardless of whether the wage-earners actually contributed directly
to the construction.
Use, Rental and Depreciation of Equipment
It has been held, in the absence of agreement to the contrary,
that one who agrees to perform work impliedly agrees to supply the
necessary tools at his own expense.' 6 Thus, a contractor under a
cost-plus agreement may not charge for the use of equipment owned
by him.' 7  On this point, at least, there is general agreement.' 8
However, Oklahoma has allowed a contractor to charge for repairs
to his equipment which was damaged in performance."
The contract before the court in Lytle, Campbell was on a "time
and materials" basis. Whether the operative expense test is of much
value in construing a cost-plus agreement with a different wording
would seem to be at least doubtful. If the case be taken as establish-
ing a general rule for the classification of expenses under cost-plus
contracts as a class, without regard to the particular wording of the
contract under consideration,2" it would appear to be unsound in that
it displaces the normal canons of interpretation and precludes ex-
trinsic evidence tending to show the intention of the parties.
The preferable view would seem to be that the terms "cost" and
"overhead" have no legal definition but must be interpreted in the
light of the surrounding circumstances. 2 1 This leaves the court free
to determine the intent of the parties from such factors as the customs
of the trade, the nature of the undertaking, and the tenor of the
agreement as a whole. A controlling element in one case was the
"0 Shaw v. G. B. Beaumont Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 333, 102 At. 151 (Ct. Ch.
1917); Lytle, Campbell & Co. v. Somers, Fitler & Todd Co., 276 Pa. 409,
120 At. 409 (1923), referred to with approval in Pioneer Constructors v.
Symes, 77 Ariz. 107, 267 P.2d 740 (1954); Michelson v. House, 54 N.M.
197, 218 P.2d 861 (1950).
"
TLytle, Campbell & Co. v. Somers, Fitler & Todd Co., supra note 16.
" Charles Elmer & Sons v. Kelly, 263 Fed. 687 (5th Cir. 1920); Savan-
nah A. & N. Ry. v. Oliver, 174 Fed. 140 (5th Cir. 1909); Pioneer Con-
structors v. Symes, 77 Ariz. 107, 267 P.2d 740 (1954) ; Jensen v. Manthe, 168
Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d 699 (1959) (dictum); Michelson v. House, 54 N.M.
197, 218 P.2d 861 (1950).
19 Ferguson v. A. F. Stewart Const. Co., 115 Okl. 31, 241 Pac. 121 (1925).
20 See note 3 supra.
21 Cost: Navco Hardwood Co. v. Mobile & Gulf Nay. Co., 214 Ala. 176,
106 So. 862 (1925) (on rehearing); Singer Metals, Inc. v. Industrial Man-
agement Corp., 116 Cal. App. 2d 85, 253 P.2d 515 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953);
Boston Molasses Co. v. Molasses Dist. Corp., 274 Mass. 589, 175 N.E. 150
(1931). Overhead: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford v. Western Union, 268
N.Y. 108, 196 N.E. 760 (1935).
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fact that the contract called for the abnormally high profit of two
hundred per cent."2
Nearly all of the litigation over the proper meaning of the word
"cost" in cost-plus contracts could have been prevented by careful
draftsmanship. Due to the unsettled state of the law in the area and
the relative lack of authority,2" the attorney faced with the task of
drafting such an agreement would be well advised to carefully define
the specific items intended to be covered by or excluded from "cost."
JOSEPH STEVENS FERRELL
Contracts-Indefinite Duration of Exclusive Sales Agreements-Dis-
tributor's Right to Prospective Profits for a Reasonable Time
In the recent case of General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors
Inc.,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court, by way of dictum, ap-
proved the majority view that an exclusive sales and distributors
contract, which expresses no time for its duration, will by implication
of law be considered to run for a reasonable period of time.2
The parties orally agreed that the defendant would be the sole
and exclusive distributor of plaintiff-manufacturer's product in North
and South Carolina for an indefinite period of time. Shortly there-
after, due to insufficiency of defendant's working capital, the parties
executed a written agreement, known as a "Warehouse Agreement,"
whereby the plaintiff agreed to consign goods to defendant while
retaining legal title to them. A year later this agreement was altered
by an oral modification which provided that plaintiff would continue
his consignment of goods as before for a stated period of three years,
during which time the defendant would purchase the goods by
monthly installments. Under this purchasing agreement, the de-
fendant, who was in arrears in payments, refused to surrender the
goods upon request and plaintiff brought this action to recover their
"The court quite properly held that cost was intended to include only
actual out-of-pocket expenses. Loewy v. A. Rosenthal, Inc., 104 F. Supp.
496 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
- North Carolina has never explicitly ruled on the construction of a cost-
plus contract, but in Harris & Harris v. Crain & Denbo, 256 N.C. 110, 123
S.E.2d 590 (1962), the court clearly implied they were inclined to the ma-jority view that overhead cannot be considered part of cost.
-253 N.C. 459, 117 S.E.2d 479 (1960).
'E. I. Du Pont Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224 (8th
Cir. 1933); J. C. Millett Co. v. Park Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp.
484 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Elson & Co. v. Beselin & Co., 116 Neb. 729, 218 N.W.
753 (1928).
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